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PRINCIPLES, PRAGMATISM,  
AND POLITICS:  
THE EVOLUTION OF WASHINGTON 
STATE’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
KATE STITH* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines have received much 
attention (and criticism),1 we do well to remember that the United States is a 
federal system, and that each of the fifty states has its own sentencing rules and 
procedures. Today, roughly half of the states have sentencing commissions that 
issue guidelines2—which are generally similar to the federal guidelines in form3 
but different in structure and content.4 This article examines the history and 
operation of sentencing in Washington state, an early leader in the development 
of sentencing guidelines in the United States. Washington state’s guidelines are 
far less complex and rigid than the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, 
whereas federal judges exercise discretion only by departing from the guidance 
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Washington guidelines themselves 
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 1.  See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1631, 1636–67 (2012).  
 2.  About NASC, NAT’L ASS’N OF SENTENCING COMM’NS, http://www.thenasc.org/ 
aboutnasc.html  (last visited Dec. 14, 2011) (listing the sentencing commission or council websites for 
twenty-two states); but see also S. 5891, 62d Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (eliminating the 
Washington State Guideline Commission as an independent agency in 2011 due to state budgetary 
concerns).  
 3.  See Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural 
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1325 (2005) (“Most American sentencing guidelines systems use 
some form of sentencing grid or table similar to the federal model . . . .”); cf. STITH & CABRANES, supra 
note 1, at 177 (noting that “[s]everal states have adopted only nonbinding guidelines or guidelines in 
‘narrative’ format . . . rather than a grid like the Sentencing Table”). 
 4.  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 177, 248 n.149 (“[N]o other jurisdiction has produced 
sentencing guidelines that come close to matching the United States Sentencing Guidelines in 
complexity and rigidity.”); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF SENTENCING COMM’NS, OVERVIEW OF NASC 1, 
available at http://www.thenasc.org/images/NASC_Overview.pdf (“[T]he sentencing policy changes 
among the early states, while similar in some aspects, were structured differently depending on each 
state’s criminal code and sentencing structure.”).   
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encourage the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing the individual 
offender. 
In the early 1980s, when Washington began its sentencing reforms, the State 
was at the forefront of a national movement.5 A number of goals motivated its 
reforms, including the desire to combat “unwarranted” sentencing disparities, 
to create greater transparency and uniformity in the sentencing process, and to 
promote a punitive philosophy of “just deserts.”6 In the initial stages of those 
reforms, the state sought to reduce sentencing disparities by confining judicial 
discretion to “exceptional” cases.7 As the number of incarcerated offenders 
continually increased,8 Washington expanded the discretion of trial judges to 
impose more non-prison sentences.9 That move highlights the inherent tension 
between the high ideals of just deserts and uniformity on the one hand, and the 
practical reality of limited resources on the other. 
One especially interesting aspect of Washington state’s guidelines system is 
that, from the beginning, most aggravating factors that resulted in a higher 
guideline range were treated as equivalent to elements of the crime—to be 
charged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.10 
However, one of the few factors not treated as an “element” was fact-finding 
that could trigger an “exceptional” sentence above the guideline range; judges, 
not juries, found such facts, and the standard of proof was by a preponderance 
of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.11 In Blakely v. 
Washington,12 the Supreme Court famously held that such judicial fact-finding 
violated the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and to 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.13 In the wake of Blakely, Washington state 
decided to treat all exacerbating sentencing factors, including those allowing 
imposition of an “exceptional” sentence, as elements of the underlying crime.14 
That remedy, like Washington state’s guidelines system itself, was legislatively 
prescribed. 
Washington’s system has several advantages over the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. First, the severity of sentencing in Washington, although greater 
 
 5.  David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME & 
JUST. 71, 71 (2001) (“Washington State enacted what at the time was the most comprehensive reform 
of adult sentencing laws in the nation.”).  
 6.  See id. at 84–85 (describing the sentencing policy issues the legislation resolved).  
 7.  Id. at 88. 
 8.  Id. at 114.  
 9.  Id. at 113–14.  
 10.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.537 (2011). Since 1983, for instance, Washington has provided 
a sentencing enhancement for use of a deadly weapon, and this is effectively treated as an element of 
the crime. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.125 (2000) (now codified at § 9.94A.825 (2011)) (requiring jury 
trial and special verdict for deadly weapon sentencing enhancement). 
 11.  Id. § 9.94A.535.   
 12.  542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 13.  Id. at 305.  
 14.  Lenell Nussbaum, Sentencing in Washington After Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 23, 24–25 (2005).  
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than before the guidelines, has not skyrocketed to the extent it has in the 
federal system.15 Second, Washington appears to have been more successful in 
restraining prosecutorial control over sentencing.16 Yet Washington’s sentencing 
regime is not without its own weaknesses; in particular, the state (like the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission) has put great store in relatively arbitrary measures of 
“compliance” in measuring its success, while largely ignoring less visible forms 
of sentencing disparity.17 And despite its efforts to encourage more non-
incarcerative sentences,18 imprisonment rates and prison costs have continued to 
rise.19 
II 
THE ROAD FROM INDETERMINATE TO GUIDELINE SENTENCING 
With the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA),20 sentencing 
in Washington state underwent a radical transformation. Under the new law, 
the state’s longstanding system of expansive judicial and parole discretion was 
replaced with a set of statutory sentencing guidelines enacted by the state 
legislature.21 
The SRA established the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission (“the Commission”) to draft the guidelines.22 At the federal level 
and in other states, there were initial efforts to distance newly established 
sentencing commissions from the vagaries of politics.23 In Washington, however, 
the Commission and its guidelines were transparently part of, and subject to, 
 
 15.  See STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, 20 YEARS IN SENTENCING: A 
LOOK AT WASHINGTON STATE ADULT FELONY SENTENCING FISCAL YEARS 1989 TO 2008, at 22–29 
(2010) [hereinafter 20 YEARS IN SENTENCING]. Cf. LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236019,  PROBATION AND PAROLE IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 29 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
ppus10.pdf (reporting Washington state as having one of the highest community supervision rates per 
100,000 adults of all U.S. states).  
 16.  See infra Part VI; see also Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 118–23 (discussing, three years 
before Blakely v. Washington, the regional differences in prosecutorial practices across Washington). 
But see David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 JUDICATURE 196, 199 
(1994) (writing, ten years before Blakely, that “[w]hile no formal studies have been conducted, there 
are no indications [these] provisions have had any effect [on curbing prosecutorial discretion]. The 
reasons are probably institutional”).  
 17.  See Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 80–81; STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
COMM’N, DISCRETION UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT AND THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V. 
WASHINGTON 15 (Dec. 1, 2005) [hereinafter DISCRETION UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT]; 
see also Kim Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 233, 238 (2005) (explaining that “[a]dvisory guidelines can probably expect success where other 
mechanisms serve as a strong incentive to judicial compliance”).  
 18.  See 20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 46–48.  
 19.  Id. at 13–14. 
 20.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 519 (codified as amended at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2011)). 
 21.  See id. § 12. 
 22.  Id. § 4.  
 23.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 42–46 (1998); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING 
MATTERS 60–61 (1996). 
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political forces inside and outside of the state legislature.24 Moreover, the SRA 
and the Commission set both idealistic and pragmatic goals at the outset of the 
project.25 These factors—legislative primacy and a mixed-goal approach—
resulted in a system that has both reduced visible disparities and endured with 
few structural changes.26 On the other hand, Washington’s initial success at 
reducing incarceration costs has given way to national trends of greater reliance 
on, and longer periods of, incarceration.27 
As noted, the guidelines the Commission created are similar in structure to 
the federal guidelines: Washington uses a sentencing grid—a two-dimensional 
matrix—with the seriousness of the offense on one axis and the defendant’s 
prior criminal record on the other. Each box on the grid provides a relatively 
small sentencing range.28 
A.  Indeterminate Sentencing 
In the decades preceding the Sentencing Reform Act, Washington 
employed indeterminate sentencing and was explicitly committed to 
rehabilitation. In a system of “indeterminate sentencing,” a defendant’s release 
date is not set by the sentencing judge, but by the parole board. Because 
indeterminate sentencing allows state officials to make individualized 
determinations about a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation—and to adjust 
that determination in light of the defendant’s subsequent progress—this 
approach is tied both philosophically and historically to a commitment to 
rehabilitation as one of the goals of punishment.29 Washington’s indeterminate 
structure divided all felony convictions into three broad categories: Class A, B, 
 
 24.  See Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 § 4(1) (“A sentencing guidelines commission is established 
as an agency of state government.”); id. § 6 (“The commission consists of fifteen voting members, one 
of whom the governor shall designate as chairperson. With the exception of ex officio voting members, 
the voting members of the commission shall be appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by 
the senate.”). In its most recent form, the commission consisted of twenty voting members. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.94A860(2) (2011). 
 25.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 § 1. 
 26.  Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 72.  
 27.  Compare 20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 45–46, with PAUL GUERINO ET AL., 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 5–6 
(2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. But cf. LAUREN E. GLAZE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1–2 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cpus10.pdf (reporting a total population decline in adult correctional systems).  
 28.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510 (2011). 
 29.  See VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 87 (2009) (asserting that in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, Washington state “created a kind of penal sanctioning based on the principle of parsimony. 
. . . [S]tate officials actively pursued policies to divert offenders away from prison and release inmates 
early and in large volume through good time credits, parole, and work release. Officials also restricted 
parole revocation . . . .”). For a detailed explanation and critique of the indeterminate sentencing 
system in Washington at that time, see Jack Meyerson, The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles and 
Indeterminate Sentencing: A Critique, 51 WASH. L. REV. 617 (1976).  
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and C felonies.30 Each felony class had a maximum prison term, and the judge 
had complete discretion to sentence an individual to any term, from probation31 
to the statutory maximum.32 The sentence imposed was not subject to appellate 
review.33 But the sentence pronounced by the judge was simply the maximum 
prison term, for it was Washington’s parole authorities who truly determined 
when prisoners were released.34 In accordance with the reigning rehabilitative 
theory of the time, the state parole board decided release dates based on 
individual inmates’ progress and expert evaluation.35 Those decisions were 
opaque and ad hoc; the Washington Board of Prison Terms and Paroles did not 
even promulgate comprehensive guidelines until 1976.36 
During this era, in Washington as in the nation more generally, retribution 
was a distinctly secondary rationale for criminal punishment. In the 1910 case of 
State v. Strasburg,37 for instance, the state supreme court quoted the 
government’s brief: 
[T]he science of criminology now convinces us that . . . a dominant percentage of all 
criminals are not free moral agents, but, as a result of hereditary influences or early 
environments, are either mentally or morally degenerate . . . . [and that the purpose of 
sentencing] is to instruct, educate, and reform rather than further to debase the 
individual . . . .
38
 
By the 1970s, however, widespread criticism of indeterminate sentencing 
had surfaced in Washington and throughout the nation, as scholars such as Alan 
Dershowitz and Andrew Von Hirsch argued for a renewed focus on 
retribution.39 Both the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys and 
the Washington State Bar Association proposed revisions to the criminal code 
that would reflect a greater just-deserts emphasis;40 at the same time, judges and 
 
 30.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.010 (Supp. 1975); Meyerson, supra note 29, at 618 n.4 (citing 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.010 (Supp. 1975)). 
 31.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.010 (Supp. 1975). Currently, the court has discretion to 
“summarily grant or deny probation, or at a subsequent time fixed may hear and determine, in the 
presence of the defendant, the matter of probation of the defendant, and the conditions of such 
probation, if granted.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.200 (2011). 
 32.  Meyerson, supra note 29, at 617–18 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.010 (1974)). 
 33.  See Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 86 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.340 (2001)). 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  See Meyerson, supra note 29, passim.  
 36.  See David Boerner, Comparative Study of Prosecution Systems 23 (April 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 37.  60 Wash. 106 (1910). 
 38.  Id. at 122 (quoting Brief for Respondent, State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106). For an examination 
of this same phenomenon at the national level, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 18–24. See also 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. 3 at 227 (1962).  
 39.  See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION (1976); Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate 
Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974). For a discussion of the 
widespread criticism of indeterminate sentencing in the 1970s, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 
30–34; TONRY, supra note 23, at 10.  
 40.  See Boerner, supra note 36, at 17 (reporting that the Washington Association of Prosecuting 
Attorneys proposed a draft criminal code in 1973, and the Washington State Bar Association proposed 
a draft code in 1974). 
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prosecutors began to adopt internal standards governing their own conduct and 
discretion.41 By the end of the decade, a subcommittee of the House Social and 
Health Services Committee had decided to reexamine the state’s criminal 
sentencing system and develop policy recommendations for the legislature.42 
Finally, in 1981, Washington enacted the Sentencing Reform Act.43 
B.  The Sentencing Reform Act 
When it moved to adopt some form of determinate sentencing, the 
Washington state legislature considered two possible models. The first, 
represented by California’s 1976 Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, was an 
entirely legislative process; the California Legislature had enacted a new 
sentencing law that dramatically curtailed the discretion of both sentencing 
judges and the Adult Authority, California’s parole board.44 The second model, 
represented by reforms in Pennsylvania and Minnesota, involved the creation of 
a new administrative agency—a sentencing commission that would develop new 
sentencing rules pursuant to a general legislative mandate.45 
Washington adopted a middle ground between those two models. The 
legislature created a sentencing commission to develop guidelines and advise 
the legislature, but the guidelines would become effective only when the 
legislature itself enacted them into law. Washington’s Commission would be 
composed of fifteen voting members drawn from a variety of legal, political, and 
law enforcement backgrounds; the governor would appoint all members.46 The 
Commission would also evaluate the efficacy and results of current practices 
and policies, advise the legislature on future amendments to the guidelines and 
other sentencing laws, and recommend modifications to current sentencing 
practices.47 That approach allowed the legislature to take advantage of the time, 
energy, and expertise of a dedicated sentencing agency while still maintaining 
democratic control over the process. More transparently and directly than any 
other jurisdiction with a sentencing commission, the Washington state 
legislature thus reposed in itself, rather than in the Commission, the broad 
authority previously delegated to judges and parole officials. In 1983, in a nearly 
unanimous vote, the legislature adopted the Commission’s proposed guidelines 
with only minor changes.48 
 
 41.  Boerner, supra note 36, at 18–19 (describing a series of written policies “restrict[ing] the filing 
of habitual criminal charges to only a few of the cases in which they were technically sustainable”). 
 42.  See Mary Kay Becker, Washington State’s New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZ. L. 
REV. 289, 289–312 (1979). 
 43.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 127, p. 354.   
 44.  See Act of Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1139, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5140 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 3000–3104 (West 2011)).  
 45.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 244.09–244.11 (2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2151–2156 (2011). 
 46.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 519 § 6. 
 47.  Id. §§ 4–6.  
 48.  See Act of Jan. 10, 1983, ch. 115, 1983 Wash. Sess. Laws 546 (codified as amended at WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.94 (2011)). 
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The SRA instructed the Commission to create a “series of recommended 
standard sentence ranges for all felony offenses.”49 As has been true of virtually 
all sentencing reform efforts around the country in the last three decades, the 
legislature insisted that its general objective was to make the criminal justice 
system “accountable to the public” and to “structure” judicial discretion so as to 
reduce disparity.50 The SRA rejected rehabilitation as the primary purpose of 
punishment, and focused instead on retribution and general deterrence. To that 
end, the law announced that the new sentencing system would seek to “(1) 
Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the 
seriousness of the offense and the offender’s criminal history; (2) Promote 
respect for the law by providing punishment which is just; [and] (3) Be 
commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar 
offenses.”51 The statute’s list of objectives also included the intention to “[o]ffer 
the offender an opportunity to improve him or herself” and “[m]ake frugal use 
of the state’s resources.”52 However, those appeared as the final two purposes 
specified in the SRA, perhaps reflecting an initial hierarchy of values. 
At the same time, the SRA instructed the Commission not to consider 
factors relating to the defendant’s background and character. In its mandate to 
the Commission, the legislature insisted that the recommended ranges should 
be based solely on the seriousness of the offense and “the extent and nature of 
the offender’s criminal history.”53 In 1983, as the Commission’s recommended 
ranges were enacted into law, the legislature emphasized that the guidelines 
would “apply equally to offenders in all parts of the state, without 
discrimination as to any element that does not relate to the crime or the 
previous record of the defendant.”54 
Any reader familiar with the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines will read 
the previous paragraph with a sense of déjà vu. The U.S. Congress echoed the 
Washington legislature’s mandates to the state Commission in its Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, the law that created the U.S. Sentencing Commission.55 
Moreover, the federal Commission responded much as Washington’s 
Commission had, with presumptive guidelines and a grid, and by discouraging 
consideration of the offender’s personal history and characteristics.56 Yet 
relevant constituencies in Washington have widely accepted the state 
 
 49.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 § 4. 
 50.  Id. § 1. 
 51.  Id.   
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. § 4. 
 54.  Act of Jan. 10, 1983, ch. 115, § 5, 1983 Wash. Sess. Laws 546, 551 (codified as amended at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.340 (2011)).  
 55.  Compare Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. II, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.), with Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 § 1.  
 56.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510 (establishing “sentencing grid” table); id. § 9.94A.530 
(establishing the “[s]tandard sentence range,” previously codified at § 9.94A.370 with the title 
“Presumptive sentence”). In State v. Hunley, 287 P.3d 584 (Wash. 2012), the Washington Supreme 
Court held one aspect of this provision (relating to proof of criminal history) unconstitutional.  
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guidelines,57 and evaluations in secondary literature have been mostly positive,58 
while the federal guidelines, at least in their mandatory form, were widely 
reviled.59 
Why have the two reforms been received so differently? Perhaps the simple 
and less rigid structure of Washington’s guidelines, discussed below, is one 
explanation. Whereas the federal guidelines were functionally mandatory,60 
Washington state authorized and encouraged the use of “alternative” and 
“exceptional” non-guideline sentences.61 Perhaps the content of the guidelines 
themselves in Washington state gained greater acceptance because the state’s 
larger, more professionally diverse Commission incorporated more voices and 
served a greater number of interests than did the federal Commission. Perhaps 
the polity in Washington state—the public and the legislature, state prosecutors, 
and the defense bar—had greater consensus on the proper purposes, general 
severity, and considerations in determining punishment than is true of the 
country as a whole. 
There is one other factor that may help explain this difference in 
constituency reaction: the state Commission, to a much greater extent than the 
federal Commission, based its guidelines on past sentencing practice.62 In other 
words, its presumptive sentencing guidelines usually sought to replicate past 
sentences,63 with relatively minor, interstitial changes (in particular, the 
increased availability of non-incarcerative sentences) that were recommended 
by the associations of both superior court judges and prosecuting attorneys.64 As 
a result, the introduction of Washington state’s guidelines did not produce the 
marked increase in sentencing severity seen in the federal system.65 On the 
federal level, both the proportion of non-probationary sentences and the 
duration of prison sentences jumped precipitously with the introduction of 
 
 57.  See Boerner, supra note 36, at 24 (noting that the Sentencing Reform Act “represent[ed] . . . 
otherwise disparate interests and groups”); see also id. at 22–24 (explaining that voluntary sentencing 
guidelines, developed by various state bodies before the official Washington guidelines, helped “judges 
and other professionals . . . to understand the benefits of the structuring influence of external 
standards.”). 
 58.  See DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON 1–3 (1985) (“The sense one has from a 
review of the Sentencing Reform Act is of thoughtful and responsible reform.”). 
 59.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 5 & 197 nn.13–14. Interestingly, federal judges, 
defense attorneys, and prosecutors appear to be content with the current system of “advisory” federal 
guidelines. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 1, at 1633–34 nn.8–11.  
 60.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–35 (2005) (concluding that the Guidelines were 
effectively mandatory because they permitted only a limited departure authority in some but not all 
cases); Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 1, at 1635, 1646–57.  
 61.  These are discussed infra Part III.  
 62.  BARKER, supra note 29, at 106 (“The emergence of sentencing guidelines in Washington . . .  
was the result of an ongoing reform process that began in the late 1960s and intensified in the 1970s 
with the movement away from fortress prisons toward de-escalation.”). 
 63.  Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 86.  
 64.  See Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 519 § 4. 
 65.  BARKER, supra note 29, at 105 (arguing that Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act actually 
formalized the principle of parsimony that underlied the state’s sentencing practices in the late 1960s 
and 1970s).  
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sentencing guidelines.66 In contrast, the introduction of Washington’s guidelines 
initially produced an overall decrease in the proportion of convicted felons 
receiving a prison sentence,67 as well as a decrease in the average length of 
actual time spent in prison.68 Thus, the negative response to the federal 
guidelines may have been due not only to their turn toward general deterrence 
and just deserts, their complexity, and their grid-like structure, but also to their 
severe content. 
Washington’s reforms were also different in that the Commission sought to 
structure the exercise of both judicial discretion and prosecutorial discretion. 
The Washington state SRA specifically instructed the Commission to create 
“recommended prosecuting standards in respect to the charging of offenses and 
plea agreements.”69 Accordingly, Washington’s guidelines provide direct 
guidance to prosecutors and expressly seek to structure prosecutorial decision-
making. In contrast, although the federal guidelines provide “policy guidance” 
regarding plea agreements,70 that guidance is directed only at federal judges, not 
prosecutors. By seeking to rein in prosecutorial discretion, Washington may 
have avoided the concomitant increase in prosecutorial leverage that took place 
at the federal level—a consequence of the federal guidelines that has produced 
considerable criticism.71 
Of course, the substance of Washington’s sentencing guidelines has not 
remained frozen since 1983. A number of changes—amendments proposed by 
the Commission and adopted by the legislature, amendments adopted by the 
legislature independent of the Commission, court decisions, and citizen 
initiatives—have altered the sentencing system, sometimes significantly, in the 
ensuing decades.72 But, beyond the changes mandated by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Blakely v. Washington,73 the structure of Washington’s system has 
remained stable. 
III 
SENTENCING UNDER THE GUIDELINES 
Under the guidelines, a judge may impose three types of sentences: standard 
sentences, alternative sentences, and exceptional sentences. For each crime as 
adjusted by any statutory mitigating or aggravating factors, there is a 
presumptive sentence range that varies with the individual offender’s criminal 
 
 66.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 63. 
 67.  See DAVID L. FALLEN, SENTENCING PRACTICES UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT 5 
(1987). 
 68.  Id. at 8. 
 69.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 § 4. 
 70.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 6.  
 71.  See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 1, at 195–97 n.12. 
 72.  For an overview of the developments in Washington’s sentencing system, see Boerner & Lieb, 
supra note 5. 
 73.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
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history; a “standard sentence” is one that falls within that range.74 For many 
less-serious crimes, the guidelines also authorize an “alternative sentence,” 
which generally involves reduced imprisonment.75 “Exceptional sentences” are 
imposed when a judge determines that there are “substantial and compelling 
reasons justifying” a sentence (other than an alternative sentence) outside the 
guideline range.76 An exceptional sentence may be either more lenient or more 
severe than the guideline range. While Washington has a few mandatory 
minimum sentences,77 it has resorted to these minimum sentences far less often 
than have other states and the federal government.78 One possible reason for 
Washington’s reduced reliance on mandatory minimum sentences is that the 
guidelines’ “standard” sentence, which itself is legislatively enacted, effectively 
operates as a statutory mandatory minimum sentence absent the mitigating 
circumstances permitting an alternative sentence or the extraordinary 
circumstances warranting an exceptional sentence. Washington’s sentencing 
code contains an extensive list of felonies, grouping the vast majority of these 
into fourteen classes, or “seriousness levels,” which form the rows of the 
standard sentencing grid.79 Those rows intersect columns representing “offender 
scores” that ascend from a score of zero through “9 and up,” producing 140 cells 
in total.80 The number and kinds of previous convictions determine the 
“offender score.”81 The offender scoring rules are somewhat complex, with 
different types of prior convictions counting differently depending on the 
nature of the current crime.82 The system for scoring offense “seriousness level,” 
however, is contained within a single section of the sentencing code83 and is far 
simpler than the federal sentencing guidelines. 
 
 74.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.530 (2011); see also id. § 9.94A.533 (listing adjustments to 
standard sentences); id. § 9.94A.506 (listing limitations to standard sentencing ranges).  
 75.  See id. §§ 9.94A.650–690. 
 76.  Id. § 9.94A.535. 
 77.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.540 (providing for mandatory minimum terms for first 
degree murder, certain first degree assaults, first degree rape, and “sexually violent predator escape”).  
 78.  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM A-1–18 (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandator
y_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_PDF/Appendix_A.pdf (listing 194 federal statutes that require 
mandatory minimum prison terms); CHRISTOPHER REINHART, CONN. OFFICE OF LEGIS. RESEARCH, 
2008-R-0619, CRIMES WITH MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON SENTENCES—UPDATED AND REVISED 
(2008), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0619.htm (listing scores of offenses, including 
burglary and repeat DUI, for which Connecticut law requires mandatory minimum prison terms).  
 79.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510. The Commission and legislature left certain rare offenses 
uncategorized, so as to allow for judicial discretion in imposing a sentence between zero and twelve 
months of imprisonment. 
 80.  Id. By contrast, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain 258 sentencing cells. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5A.  
 81.  WASH. REV. CODE . § 9.94A.525 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id.  
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Each of the grid’s 140 cells contains the presumptive sentencing range—for 
example, “195–260” months—as well as a median sentence.84 Judges who 
properly calculate the sentencing range and impose a sentence within this range 
cannot be reversed on appeal. Moreover, because the SRA abolished parole, 
the sentence handed down by the judge is the sentence that the offender will 
serve, though it may be reduced by “good time” credits earned while 
incarcerated, allowing the offender to shorten his effective sentence.85 But good 
time credits can amount to no more than fifteen percent of the sentence for 
most violent and sexual offenses and no more than fifty percent for most other 
offenders.86 
The availability of sentencing alternatives appears to have been critical to 
the initial success of Washington’s system. Sentencing alternatives include the 
First-Time Offender Waiver,87 the Special Sex Offender Sentencing 
Alternative,88 the Parenting Sentencing Alternative,89 and the recently 
introduced Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative.90 Judges have discretion to 
sentence eligible offenders either under these alternative sentencing guidelines 
or in accordance with the standard grid. Alternative sentences are subject to 
reversal on appeal for “abuse of discretion.”91 
Under the First-Time Offender Waiver, any offender without a criminal 
record (and whose crime of conviction is not exempted from this provision) is 
eligible to have his or her standard guideline sentence waived.92 The alternative 
sentences available include (1) as long as two years in drug or other treatment, 
(2) as long as a year in community custody, (3) as long as ninety days in a 
county jail, and (4) supervised probation.93 Because the law treats the First-
Time Offender Waiver as the equivalent of a standard sentence, the trial judge’s 
decision to use the waiver cannot be reversed on appeal as long as the 
individual’s eligibility for the alternative sentence was properly determined.94 
The program reflects the pragmatism that pervades Washington’s sentencing 
regime, which allows the state to balance a philosophy of just deserts with its 
interest in providing opportunities for rehabilitation and reducing the state’s 
prison population. 
 
 84.  Id. §§ 9.94A.510, 9.94A.517. 
 85.  Id. § 9.94A.729.  
 86.  Id. § 9.94A.729. The provision authorizing a fifty-percent reduction—subsection (3)(c)—does 
not apply to offenders convicted after July 1, 2010 of causing injury to another person. 
 87.  Id. § 9.94A.650. 
 88.  Id. § 9.94A.670. 
 89.  Id. § 9.94A.655. 
 90.  Id. § 9.94A.660.  
 91.  State v. Jackson, 809 P.2d 221 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hays, 776 P.2d 718, 720 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1989); see also BOERNER, supra note 58, at 8.  
 92.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.650 (2011).  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. § 9.94A.585. 
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The Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA)95 represents 
another pragmatic deviation from the guidelines’ emphasis on retribution—and 
a retreat from the rehabilitative ideal. Rather than standing firmly on abstract 
principle, Washington listened to victim advocates and psychologists.96 Victim 
advocates argued that victims of sex offenders, who are often family members, 
would be less likely to press charges if the guidelines’ severe presumptive 
sentences were the only option.97 At the same time, criminal psychology experts 
emphasized that sex offenders’ behavior is compulsive, with high rates of 
recidivism unless the offenders are treated.98 Under SSOSA, offenders 
convicted of sex offenses may be spared the guideline sentence as long as they 
meet certain criteria; for example, the offense may not be a “serious[ly] violent” 
sexual offense, the offender must have no prior convictions for a sex offense, 
and he or she must be found to be amenable to treatment.99 As long as the 
offender is eligible, SSOSA allows the trial judge to sentence the individual to a 
course of treatment and to design specialized prohibitions that will both aid 
rehabilitation and protect the community.100 Indeed, SSOSA has been successful 
in curbing recidivism.101 
The Parenting Sentencing Alternative allows the court to waive the standard 
sentence for certain offenders who have custody of children under eighteen and 
to replace those sentences with twelve months of community custody. Similarly, 
the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative provides for treatment of offenders 
who commit minor drug crimes and are deemed to be “addicted.” As such, 
these alternatives allow judges the flexibility to prescribe effective courses of 
treatment and to meet the needs of offenders’ dependents without being subject 
to the higher standards of review that apply to exceptional sentence departures. 
As noted, an exceptional sentence is one that departs from the guideline 
sentencing range and is not otherwise authorized. Exceptional sentences may 
range between zero time in confinement—or the statutory mandatory 
minimum, if there is one—and the statutory maximum. Unlike the codified 
sentencing alternatives, exceptional sentences are subject to substantive 
appellate review.102 The decision to impose an exceptional sentence is governed 
by case law interpreting the phrase “substantial and compelling reasons,” which 
is the statutory criteria under which an exceptional sentence must be justified.103 
 
 95.  Id. § 9.94A.670. 
 96.  Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 94. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.670 (2011). 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  WASH. STATE SEX OFFENDER POLICY BD., ANN. REP. LEG. 38 (2009) (“[S]ex offenders that 
completed SSOSA’s [sic] had the lowest recidivism rates of all categories.”) (citing ROBERT 
BARNOSKI, WASH. STATE INST. PUB. POL’Y, SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE: 
RECIDIVISM RATES (2005)).  
 102.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.585 (2011). 
 103.  Id. § 9.94A.535 (“The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an 
offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling 
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The SRA requires the judge imposing the sentence to provide a written 
explanation of the reasons justifying the extent of her departure from the 
guideline range. Because both the government and the defendant can appeal an 
exceptional sentence, the decision to impose such a sentence is almost always 
subject to appellate review. The SRA provides three standards for reviewing an 
exceptional sentence: (1) whether the sentence and reasons supplied “are not 
supported by the record” that was before the trial judge, (2) whether they “do 
not justify a sentence outside the standard sentence range,” or (3) whether the 
imposed sentence “was clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.”104 
Interestingly, Washington’s courts have interpreted the SRA to preclude 
exceptional sentences that are aimed at either rehabilitation or incapacitation. 
In State v. Estrella,105 Washington’s supreme court overturned an exceptional 
sentence that sought to allow a repeat offender an opportunity at employment. 
The court held that “an exceptional sentence is appropriate only when the 
circumstances of the crime distinguish it from other crimes of the same statutory 
category.”106 According to the court, the trial judge’s reasoning—that the 
offender “appear[ed] to be a good risk not to re-offend if he c[ould] be worked 
back into society gradually and under direction and supervision”—did not 
provide adequate grounds for a sentence below the guideline range.107 Similarly, 
in State v. Barnes,108 the Washington Supreme Court ruled that “future 
dangerousness” was not a sufficient reason to impose an exceptional sentence in 
non-sexual-offense cases.109 The reasoning of those cases suggests that neither 
incapacitation nor rehabilitation could ever be a sufficient basis for an 
exceptional sentence;110 exceptional sentences must be based on the criminal act 
itself, rather than on characteristics of the offender.111 However, in an important 
recent decision increasing the scope of judicial sentencing discretion,112 the 
Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that when the sentencing court 
orders an exceptional sentence below the presumptive sentencing range, the 
court is not bound by the seemingly mandatory language in the SRA requiring 
consecutive (as opposed to concurrent) sentences for crimes arising “from 
separate and distinct criminal conduct.”113 Even though alternative sentences 
allow judges to impose sentences outside the guidelines range, the Sentencing 
Commission nonetheless scores these sentences as being in “compliance” with 
 
reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”); see, e.g., State v. Barnes, 818 P.2d 1088 (Wash. 1991); 
State v. Estrella, 798 P.2d 289 (Wash. 1990); State v. Pascal, 736 P.2d 1065 (Wash. 1987). 
 104.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.585(4) (2011). 
 105.  798 P.2d 289 (Wash. 1990). 
 106.  Id. at 293. 
 107.  Id. at 290. 
 108.  818 P.2d 1088 (Wash. 1991). 
 109.  Id. at 1093. 
 110.  See id. at 1092–93; Estrella, 798 P.2d at 292–94. 
 111.  John M. Junker, Guidelines Sentencing: The Washington Experience, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
715, 745 (1992).  
 112.  State v. Mulholland, 161 Wash. 2d 322, 327–32 (2007).  
 113.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.589(1)(b) (2011). 
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the guidelines.114 Only exceptional sentences are scored as not in compliance 
with the guidelines. Unsurprisingly, then, studies of Washington sentencing 
boast widespread compliance with the guidelines. In 1987, the first year that the 
Commission undertook a comprehensive review of the guidelines, only 3.6% of 
sentences were exceptional; of these, 57% were departures below the guideline 
range (“mitigated” sentences).115 The remarkably high rate of compliance 
initially surprised observers because Minnesota—which has a very similar 
sentencing system—had a departure rate of 8% in the same period.116 The 
absence of codified sentencing alternatives in Minnesota’s system may well 
explain the difference in departure rates between the two states, a difference 
that has only grown over time. In 2010, Minnesota had a 25% departure rate,117 
while Washington’s rate was 4.5%.118 If Washington’s alternative sentences 
(imposed in 11% of cases) are treated as departures, however, the state’s 
departure rate approximately triples.119 
Sentencing authorities in Washington have thus provided significant 
opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion within the structure of the 
guidelines themselves, such that sentencing judges can often “comply” while 
imposing a non-guideline sentence. The result is a high rate of “compliance,” 
which has been achieved not by trying to eliminate judicial discretion (as the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines sought to do), but by specifying a broad set of 
circumstances under which discretion is available. Although some judges may 
take advantage of the availability of alternative sanctions, others may be 
content to impose a sentence within the grid range, and both types of sentence 
will be considered in compliance with the guidelines. Inevitably, then, allowing 
for judicial discretion may also allow for inter-judge sentencing disparity. 
IV 
REAL OFFENSE SENTENCING, ENHANCEMENTS, AND BLAKELY 
One of the most controversial aspects of modern sentencing reform, at both 
the state and federal level, has been the rise of “real offense” sentencing. Under 
this approach, courts look at actual criminal conduct rather than the statutory 
crime alone. The federal guidelines are perhaps the preeminent example of a 
real offense system, for they explicitly provide for adjustments based on factors 
that are not elements of the statutory offense, such as the quantity of harm 
 
 114.  FALLEN, supra note 67, at 14–16. 
 115.  Id. at 14–16.  
 116.  Id.  
 117.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY 
STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2010, at 21 (2010), available at 
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/data_reports/2010/2010%20MN%20Sentencing%20Guidelines%20Comm
%20Monitoring%20Data%20Report.pdf.  
 118.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT 
FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at iv (2011), available at http://media.digitalarchives.wa.gov/ 
WA.Media/do/22B26EF162FD873B071B90DA9A77AFCB.pdf.  
 119.  Id. at 31. 
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caused and the presence of a variety of aggravating (and a few mitigating) 
factors.120 Indeed, in the federal system, an offender’s sentence may even be 
increased if the judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
offender committed a prior crime of which the jury acquitted him.121 
In Washington, the Commission considered adopting such an approach, but 
ultimately chose to reject most aspects of real offense sentencing. It did so both 
out of a sense of basic fairness, and because it concluded that sentencing based 
primarily on the crime of conviction would encourage prosecutors to charge 
more accurately from the outset—rather than relying on the sentencing process 
to add more time to an individual’s sentence.122 The sentencing guidelines are 
explicit on this point, providing that “[f]acts that establish the elements of a 
more-serious crime or additional crimes may not be used to go outside the 
standard sentence range except upon stipulation.”123 
That does not mean that Washington’s guidelines ignore all aggravating 
factors beyond the statutory elements of individual crimes. To the contrary, the 
guidelines list a variety of aggravating “real offense” factors, such as the use of a 
firearm.124 However, by design, specified aggravating factors are charged as if 
they were elements of the underlying crime, and unless admitted by the 
defendant, must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the trial jury.125 When 
the jury finds (or the defendant admits as part of his guilty plea) an aggravating 
factor, the defendant’s standard guideline range is increased.126 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, Washington’s system does allow judges to 
impose—for “substantial and compelling reasons” found by a preponderance of 
the evidence—“exceptional” sentences that are outside of the standard 
guideline range.127 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of that system, having already held in Apprendi v. New Jersey128 
that statutory sentencing enhancements must be treated as elements of the 
underlying crime, subject to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.129 
In this watershed case, Blakely v. Washington,130 the Supreme Court examined 
the relationship between Washington’s exceptional above-guideline sentences, 
on the one hand, and underlying (and pre-existing) statutory maximum 
sentences, on the other. One theory posits that the finding of exceptional 
 
 120.  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3, 4, 5(H), 5(K).  
 121.  See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam).  
 122.  Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 88. 
 123.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.530 (2011). 
 124.  See, e.g., id. § 9.94A.602 (requiring enhancement of offense level for offenses involving use of a 
deadly weapon). 
 125.  Id.; see also Petition of Gunter, 689 P.2d 1074 (Wash. 1984) (jury must find the aggravating 
guidelines factor beyond a reasonable doubt).  
 126.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(3) (2011).  
 127.  See supra notes 101–113 and accompanying text.  
 128.  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 129.  Id. at 496. 
 130.  542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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sentencing factors effectively redefines the crime itself; under this theory, any 
fact that can be used to impose a sentence beyond the standard guideline 
maximum is constitutionally equivalent to an additional statutory element. 
Pursuant to Apprendi, such facts must either be stipulated or subject to jury 
trial and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.131 An alternative theory posits that 
the availability of an exceptional sentence above the standard guideline range is 
simply a structuring of pre-existing judicial discretion to sentence up to the 
maximum sentence provided by statute for the underlying crime of conviction. 
Under this second theory, factors warranting an exceptional sentence are not 
elements of the crime; rather, they are akin to the uncodified factors that 
sentencing judges took into account during the era of discretionary sentencing, 
and do not implicate the rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Reflecting a decade-long philosophical shift from the second theory (under 
which judicial fact-finding is permissible) towards the first (under which judicial 
fact-finding may not increase the lawful sentence),132 the Supreme Court ruled 
in Blakely that, for constitutional purposes, the relevant statutory maximum was 
the “maximum a judge may impose based solely on the facts reflected in the 
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”133 As such, Washington judges could 
not constitutionally impose exceptional sentences longer than the guideline grid 
maximum. Extending Apprendi, the Court held that the findings of fact that 
justified exceptional sentences above the standard guideline range were 
constitutionally inadequate because the judge made them at the sentencing 
phase, with the defendant having no recourse to a jury trial and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.134 
Washington judges thus found themselves in a bind. They could still 
sentence individuals to alternative (that is, non-prison) and mitigated 
exceptional sentences; however, they could not constitutionally impose harsher 
exceptional sentences. Realizing that there was now a significant asymmetry in 
the state’s sentencing regime, the state established a special subcommittee to 
develop a legislative solution for the problems Blakely created.135 One solution 
was obvious from the Blakely decision itself: the legislature could enact changes 
in the procedure for imposing an exceptional sentence above the guidelines 
range by providing that the underlying factors justifying such a sentence would 
be subject to jury trial and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.136 
 
 131.  Id. at 313. 
 132.  See Kate Stith, Crime and Punishment Under the Constitution, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 246–52 
(2004).  
 133.  542 U.S. at 296. 
 134.  Id. at 313.  
 135.  Nussbaum, supra note 14, at 24.  
 136.  See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304 (“When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone 
does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’ 
and the judge exceeds his proper authority.”) (quoting 1 JOEL P. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  55 
(2d ed. 1872)). 
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But there was another solution that the subcommittee considered: changing 
the guidelines from presumptive to “advisory.” That making the guidelines 
advisory would also solve the constitutional problem may not be obvious. Yet 
that is precisely what the Supreme Court accomplished in United States v. 
Booker,137 which was decided shortly after Blakely. In Booker, the federal 
guidelines were struck down on the same grounds as the Washington guidelines 
were in Blakely, but a divided Court went on to solve the “Blakely problem” by 
holding that henceforth, the federal guidelines would be advisory only.138 As 
Booker explained, as long as sentencing guidelines are only advisory, the 
“maximum” sentence for constitutional purposes remains the statutory 
maximum.139 In such an advisory system, the judge’s findings of enhancement 
facts are permissible because, while the sentence imposed may exceed the 
advisory guideline maximum, it can never exceed the statutory maximum. 
The advisory guidelines approach held some attraction for Washington as 
well. In particular, it had the benefit of simplicity and elegance, and other states 
had been operating with fully advisory guidelines for a decade.140 Yet there was 
concern that advisory guidelines would signal a return to wide-open 
discretionary sentencing: legislators feared that judges would be too lenient, 
while prison officials worried (inconsistently) that prison populations would 
spike.141 Still others worried that socioeconomic disparity, including racial 
disparity, would increase under advisory guidelines.142 
Washington’s Commission chose to adopt the non-advisory approach—what 
has become known in the U.S. sentencing world as “Blakely-izing” the 
guidelines. Following the lead of Kansas, which had presciently changed its 
guidelines in anticipation of Blakely,143 Washington’s sentencing commissioners 
and legislators renegotiated the line between sentencing factors and elements of 
the crime. Before Blakely, judges had determined exceptional facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence as part of a separate sentencing phase. 
Henceforth, the subcommittee suggested, all exceptional aggravating factors 
should be incorporated into the initial trial proceedings and treated like 
statutory elements of the crime, as Washington already did for enumerated 
aggravating factors such as the use of a deadly weapon.144 The subcommittee 
also reworked the “illustrative” list of reasons for aggravated exceptional 
 
 137.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 138.  Id. at 259 (Breyer, J., for the remedial majority). The Court asserted that this resolution was 
more in keeping with Congress’s intent in enacting the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Id. at 
265. 
 139.  Id. at 232. 
 140.  See DISCRETION UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT, supra note 17 (discussing the 
success of Virginia’s advisory system).  
 141.  See id. 
 142.  See id. at 21. 
 143.  See Steven J. Crossland, Comment, Durational and Dispositional Departures Under the Kansas 
Sentencing Guidelines Act: The Kansas Supreme Court’s Uneasy Passage Through Apprendi-Land, 42 
WASHBURN L.J. 687, 703–06 (2003).  
 144.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.602 (2011). 
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sentences above the guideline range, which had helped define the “substantial 
and compelling” standard. The subcommittee supplemented the list with 
additional factors drawn from the extensive case law applying this standard. 
The legislature then codified this new list as an exhaustive menu of factors for 
prosecutors to charge and prove if they sought an above-guideline sentence.145 
In the wake of those changes, the sentencing judge could impose an exceptional 
sentence only if the aggravating factors had been proven to the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or stipulated by a defendant who pled guilty.146 
Unsurprisingly, that procedural change has led to a significant decrease in 
the rate of aggravated exceptional sentences, for the requisite sentencing factors 
are now far more difficult to establish.147 In 2004, before the Blakely decision, 
57% of exceptional sentences were above the guideline range;148 in 2006, this 
figure had fallen to 45%.149 Indeed, there are fewer exceptional sentences of any 
type. In 2006, exceptional sentences represented 2.86% of total sentences 
imposed;150 in 2004, that percentage had been 4.4%.151 
V 
DIRECT POPULAR IMPACT ON SENTENCING POLICY: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE 
The existence of a broadly composed professional sentencing agency 
working closely with the legislature has not shielded Washington’s criminal 
justice policy from punitive popular reaction to fear of crime. In particular, the 
citizens of Washington can directly alter sentencing policy through the ballot 
initiative. In 1994, Washington’s voters enacted Initiative 159, known as “Hard 
Time for Armed Crime.”152 Although Washington had long provided for a 
mandatory sentencing enhancement when a weapon was used in the 
commission of a crime,153 Initiative 159 broadened the applicability of the 
enhancement and made it more severe. The Washington Institute for Policy 
Studies had developed and promoted the ballot initiative, which garnered 
widespread public support for requiring armed criminals to serve longer 
sentences.154 Upon realizing the extent of the popular enthusiasm for the 
 
 145.  Nussbaum, supra note 14, at 24. Nussbaum also explains that the decision to include sentencing 
factors as part of the initial trial—rather than holding the jury for a second phase—was meant to 
streamline the proceedings. 
 146.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(2) (2011).  
 147.  20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 41.  
 148.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT 
FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 22 (2004), available at http://wsldocs.sos.wa.gov/library/ 
docs/sgc/StatSumAdultFelonySentencing/FY2004_Statistical_Summary_2008_005088.pdf.  
 149.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT 
FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 21 (2006), available at http://wsldocs.sos.wa.gov/library/ 
docs/sgc/StatSumAdultFelonySentencing/Statistical_Summary_2006_Compressed_2008_004583.pdf.  
 150.  Id. at iv.  
 151.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 148, at iv.  
 152.  20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 31. 
 153.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.025(1) (1972); id. § 9.95.040.  
 154.  Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 107. 
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measure, the legislature itself chose to enact the measure into law even before 
its popular passage.155 The statute required sentence enhancements of eighteen 
to sixty months for felonies committed with a firearm, and six to twenty-four 
months for felonies committed with other deadly weapons.156 The Commission 
estimated that the provision would cost the state $294 million over the following 
decade and would increase the state’s prison population by 209 in the first year 
of its implementation, 810 by the fifth year, and 1,145 by its tenth anniversary.157 
The enhancements for use of a firearm are only one way that popular 
politics have directly influenced sentencing in Washington, even in the era of 
sentencing guidelines. Another provision of Initiative 159 requires prosecutors 
to make public the reasons for plea agreements,158 and requires the Commission 
to publicize the sentencing decisions of each individual judge.159 Although there 
were widespread concerns that those requirements would curtail judicial 
discretion and subject Washington’s judges, who are elected, to possible 
retaliation for seemingly lenient sentences, the data collected from the 
reporting requirements have not yet figured prominently in contested judicial 
elections.160 At the same time, however, there was a marked reduction in the 
rate of mitigated departures shortly after Initiative 159 became law.161 That has 
led some observers to theorize that the combination of a “tough-on-crime” 
political climate and judicial fears about the new reporting requirements has 
influenced trial judges in the exercise of their discretion.162 
The bundle of sentencing enhancements and reporting requirements that 
became Initiative 159 was developed on the heels of a “three strikes” initiative 
passed just two years earlier.163 That 1992 initiative, developed by the same 
think tank, provides for life in prison without parole for any offender convicted 
of three distinct serious offenses.164 The three strikes proposal had been 
defeated in the state legislature, but was passed by an overwhelming 75% of the 
public—thereby establishing the ballot initiative as an effective means of 
 
 155.  Hard Time for Armed Crime Act, ch. 129, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 443. 
 156.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.533 (2011).  
 157.  David Boerner, Sentencing Policy in Washington, in SENTENCING REFORM IN 
OVERCROWDED TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 30, 33 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hadestad 
eds., 1997). The author has been unable to find more recent data on the impact of Initiative 159.  
 158.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.475. 
 159.  Id. § 9.94A.480(2) (requiring the Sentencing Commission to “compile a yearly and cumulative 
judicial record of each sentencing judge” in enumerated felony cases, including all violent offenses).  
See, e.g., STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, JUDICIAL SENTENCING PRACTICES—
SELECTED FELONIES—CALENDAR YEAR 2007 (2008), available at http://www.cfc.wa.gov/ 
PublicationSentencing/JudicialPractice/JudicialSentencingPractices_CY2007.pdf.  
 160.  Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 107.  
 161.  20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 41. 
 162.  See Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 107. 
 163.  See R. David LaCourse, Jr., Hard Time for Armed Crime: A Review, WASH. POL’Y CENTER 
(1997), http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/brief/hard-time-armed-crime-review. 
 164.  WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.570 (2011); see id. § 9.94A.030(37) (defining a “persistent 
offender”).  
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bypassing the legislative process (and the Commission) to achieve harsher 
sentences.165 
Although the significance of those two initiatives should not be 
underestimated, the initiatives say little about the wisdom of creating a 
sentencing commission or sentencing guidelines.166 Those measures, and their 
impact on sentencing, speak more to the benefits and perils of direct democracy 
than to the adoption of a system of sentencing guidelines.167 
VI 
PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES 
Presumptive sentencing guidelines are essentially ex ante sentencing rules. 
Under such sentencing regimes, prosecutors know precisely what the 
presumptive sentencing range will be when they select a particular charge, and 
they choose accordingly. The prosecutor’s control over sentencing is amplified 
when guidelines prescribe narrow sentencing ranges and reject “real offense” 
sentencing.168 In those cases, the charges selected by the prosecutor will, for the 
most part, determine an individual’s ultimate sentence. Indeed, a standard 
objection to presumptive guidelines is that they do not so much limit sentencing 
disparity as obscure it by transferring discretion from the judge to the 
prosecutor.169 A related concern is that the prosecutor may have too much 
leverage to force guilty pleas by threatening to press a charge that has a much 
higher sentencing range if the defendant insists on going to trial. 
The Commission recognized and addressed those concerns by creating, 
alongside its sentencing guidelines, a series of codified standards that are 
intended to guide prosecutors in the exercise of their substantial discretion.170 
Published and implemented in 1983, the prosecutorial standards have been 
explicitly “advisory” only. Unlike the sentencing guidelines, which are binding 
on Washington’s judges, the state’s prosecutorial guidelines create no judicially 
enforceable rights or benefits for any party.171 Unsurprisingly, it has been 
reported that the guidelines are more routinely followed in some prosecutorial 
offices than in others.172 
Yet Washington’s prosecutorial guidelines do give trial judges a basis for 
inquiring into the exercise of prosecutorial charging and bargaining discretion, 
 
 165.  See Boerner, supra note 16, at 198 n.10.  
 166.  See Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 109. 
 167.  See also BARKER, supra note 29, at 118–20 (arguing that “these reforms may indicate a partial 
shift in government in Washington . . . toward neopopulism and away from deliberation and 
compromise,” which had characterized the state’s approach to sentencing reform through the 1980s).  
 168.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 66–67.  
 169.  See id. at 130–42. 
 170.  See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.401, .411, .421, .431, .441, .450, .460, .470, .475, .480 (2011). 
 171.  Id. § 9.94A.401. 
 172.  Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 120 (highlighting Norm Maleng’s prosecutorial practices in 
King County as representative of the adherence to the legislative guidelines and a contrast to the 
starkly different practices in other, smaller county prosecutorial offices).  
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even though in the end the resistant prosecutor may prevail. Moreover, the 
SRA itself specifically mandates that the “nature of the [plea-bargaining] 
agreement and the reasons” for any guilty plea must be presented to the 
court.173 The court has the authority to accept or reject any plea agreement on 
the basis of its own determination of whether the agreement’s terms are 
“consistent with the interests of justice and the prosecuting standards.”174 
Finally, even when accepting a plea of guilty, a judge is not bound by the 
prosecutor’s recommendations.175 Nevertheless, as has been true in the federal 
system and many other guidelines regimes, the percentage of convictions 
obtained by trial has declined significantly since the guidelines—and the 
concomitant increase in prosecutorial discretion—were introduced in 
Washington. Whereas conviction by trial constituted 9.9% of all convictions in 
1982,176 that percentage fell to 5.8% in 2010.177 
VII 
REFLECTIONS ON WASHINGTON’S GUIDELINES REGIME 
Washington’s thirty years of presumptive sentencing guidelines have yielded 
mixed results. On the one hand, the guidelines appear to have been somewhat 
effective in reducing the inter-judge sentencing disparities that triggered calls 
for determinate sentencing. And in its first few years, the new sentencing 
system was able to contain corrections costs as well. On the other hand, the 
public demand for severe sentencing of certain classes of offenders has resulted 
in harsher sentences and higher prison costs in subsequent years, through ballot 
initiatives as well as some politically popular actions of the Sentencing 
Commission and the legislature. Such measures have included mandatory 
guidelines enhancements for fleeing the police, for crimes committed with 
sexual motivation, and for crimes committed under the influence of alcohol.178 
Unsurprisingly, incarceration and associated costs have increased in 
Washington in the wake of these enhancements.179 However, as of 2008, 
Washington still has an incarceration rate in the bottom fifth of states and at 
about 60% of the national average;180 the percentage of general fund 
expenditures that the state spends on correction costs is slightly below the 
national average.181 
 
 173.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.431 (2011). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  FALLEN, supra note 67, at 77. 
 177.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 118, at 21 (reporting 2.2% 
of convictions by bench trial, 3.6% by jury trial, and the remaining 94.1% by guilty plea).  
 178.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.533.  
 179.  THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA IN 2008, at 14 (2008), 
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2008/one%20in%20100.pdf.  
 180.  WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
228417, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 31 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. 
 181.  Id. 
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A primary goal of Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act was to reduce 
“unwarranted” disparity by ensuring that punishments would “[b]e 
commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar 
offenses.”182 However, even complete compliance with the guidelines does not 
guarantee the absence of unwarranted disparities. Which sentencing disparities 
are warranted and which are unwarranted is a normative inquiry. For instance, 
what is a “similar” offense? Is it appropriate to consider prior record, age, 
motivation, collateral consequences, and so forth? If so, what weight should 
each of these factors have? These questions have confounded attempts to 
determine whether presumptive guidelines systems achieve more equality in 
sentencing than discretionary sentencing systems.183 Simply stated, the content of 
the guidelines is important to achieving sentencing justice, which itself is a 
highly contested subject. 
Nevertheless, Washington’s Commission—like sentencing commissions 
everywhere—measures the reduction in disparities largely by looking at judicial 
rates of “compliance” with its guidelines. The first study of Washington’s 
guidelines, conducted in 1987, concluded that “sentence variability” had been 
reduced by 47% from the pre-guidelines period.184 In 1991, the Commission’s 
ten-year report cited this study in concluding that the system had achieved the 
legislature’s goal of uniform sentencing.185 However, the 1987 study also showed 
racial disparities in the operation of the alternative sentence regime (such as the 
First-Time Offender Waiver).186 Yet there was no racial disparity in who 
received exceptional sentences, either mitigating or aggravating.187 Those 
inconsistent results suggested to some observers that the source of disparity in 
the alternative sentences regime might not have been judicial or prosecutorial 
bias, but, rather, differences in local community resources such as drug 
treatment centers.188 Commendably, the Washington State Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission has continued to examine those forms of disparity, and 
more recent data show a possible reduction in racial disparity in the 
implementation of sentencing alternatives.189 
A second important—though perhaps underemphasized—goal of the 
Sentencing Reform Act relates not to reducing disparity in sentencing, but to 
achieving a more cost-effective use of the state’s prison facilities. The 
importance of “frugality” was made clear from the beginning of Washington’s 
 
 182.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010.  
 183.  See generally Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 1, at 1682–1701; STITH & CABRANES, supra 
note 1, at 104–42. 
 184.  FALLEN, supra note 67, at 13. 
 185.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, A DECADE OF SENTENCING REFORM 
12 (1992) [hereinafter A DECADE OF SENTENCING REFORM]. 
 186.  The First-Time Offender Waiver is discussed supra Part III.  
 187.  FALLEN, supra note 67, at 65. 
 188.  Id. at 67. 
 189.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, DISPROPORTIONALITY AND 
DISPARITY IN ADULT FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 3 (2008). 
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sentencing reform: making “frugal use of the state’s resources” was explicitly 
listed as a legislative purpose of the reforms.190 To achieve that goal, the 
Commission was tasked with seeking to ensure that prisons would be used for 
violent offenders, and with developing non-prison alternatives for nonviolent 
offenders.191 A 2001 study by the Commission sought to measure how successful 
the guidelines system has been in achieving this goal.192 
Initially, the guidelines system appeared to be an effective way to reduce 
imprisonment of nonviolent offenders, freeing up space for more violent 
offenders. With the First-Time Offender Waiver in operation, and jail (rather 
than prison) sentences prescribed for most low-level crimes, there was both a 
reduction in the total rate of incarceration and a more directed use of prison 
sentences. In 1982, before the guidelines came into force, the imprisonment rate 
for violent offenders was 48.8%; by 1985, this number had climbed to 65.1%.193 
During the same period, imprisonment for nonviolent crimes fell from 13.3% to 
8.8%.194 
Those trends did not continue, in part because the state legislature failed to 
follow these reforms with appropriations for “alternatives to confinement for 
nonviolent offenders.”195 In addition, the American “war on drugs” has resulted 
in significant increases in the number of individuals imprisoned for drug-related 
crimes. Between 1986 and 1991, Washington experienced a 64% increase in 
total felony sentences, with a 235% increase in drug-related offenses accounting 
for a large bulk of that growth.196 Moreover, the total number of prison 
sentences in Washington increased by 167% from 1989 to 2008, an increase four 
times the rate of the increase in the adult population.197 In the same period, the 
rate of nonviolent offenders receiving prison sentences increased from 63% to 
83%—apparently due to increased sentences for drug and property violations, 
and third-degree assault (which is categorized as nonviolent in the 
Commission’s statistics).198 Of course, without sentencing alternatives such as 
the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative, there might have been an even 
larger increase in imprisonment rates in Washington. 
Moreover, it appears that an even larger portion of the increase in 
incarceration in Washington is due to increased prosecution of serious offenses. 
There is a natural tendency to attribute the increase in rates of incarceration to 
 
 190.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 (2011). 
 191.  Id. § 9.94A.850. 
 192.  STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW AND 
EVALUATION OF SENTENCING POLICY IN WASHINGTON STATE: 2000–2001 (2001); A DECADE OF 
SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 185, at 13. 
 193.  FALLEN, supra note 67, at 5. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  A DECADE OF SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 185, at 13. 
 196.  Id. at 8. 
 197.  20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 11 (providing rate of population increase for the 
nation as a whole, not for Washington in particular). 
 198.  Id. at 31. 
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increased use of prison (instead of jail or probation) and to longer prison 
sentences.199 But the data from Washington suggest that an increase in felony 
prosecutions, perhaps made possible by greater prosecutorial plea-bargaining 
leverage, is also an important cause of imprisonment rates growing faster than 
the population.200 Felony convictions in Washington have risen by 51% since 
1989.201 
Although Washington’s initial achievements—cost savings and lower prison 
population—did not last, Washington’s situation is still recognizably superior to 
that of most other states. As of 2008, Washington spends far less than most 
other states on its prison and corrections costs, and it imprisons fewer of its 
convicted offenders.202 Although Washington has not managed to avoid 
increases in its rates of imprisonment, the state has remained significantly 
behind the national curve in this regard—perhaps due to its sentencing 
commission’s active and influential concern about this growth.203 Moreover, the 
remarkable expansion in felony convictions, as well as in rates and duration of 
imprisonment, must be understood in historical perspective. Those increases are 
part of a nationwide trend, one that began several years before the adoption of 
sentencing guidelines.204 
Yet despite its continued concern, Washington’s Commission has at best 
been able to slow the growth in resort to imprisonment.205 One explanation may 
be the political visibility that a system of public guidelines brings to criminal 
sentencing, as compared to a sentencing system that relies on the discretion of 
judges and parole officials, whose decisions are relatively sheltered from the 
storms of public opinion. Moreover, in Washington, the availability and 
demonstrated success of ballot initiatives as a way to achieve these ends may 
well have affected the decisions of the Sentencing Commission, the legislature, 
and perhaps even sentencing judges. For instance, in the two decades between 
1989 and 2008, the average offender score rose from 1.4 to 2.9,206 a shift that 
appears to be due to legislated changes in the way scores are calculated.207 In the 
same period, the percentage of felony offenders receiving sentence alternatives 
 
 199.  See  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 206 n.138 (noting that changes in incarceration rates 
only “crudely” reflect whether crimes are being punished more leniently or more harshly). 
 200.  That the soaring rate of incarceration in the United States until recently was due in significant 
part to the increase in felony prosecutions is deftly discussed in WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 253–57 (2011).  
 201.  20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 16. 
 202.  Id. at 10; see also supra notes 179–182 and accompanying text. Washington has instead 
continued to increase spending on prevention and treatment. See BARKER, supra note 29, at 122 & 213 
nn.144–45. 
 203.  See A DECADE OF SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 185, at 13. 
 204.  See STUNTZ, supra note 200, at 246–53.  
 205.  See 20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 39 (“The proportion of prison sentences to 
total felony sentences averaged 42 percent between 1992 and 2006 nationally. Washington State was far 
below that, although less so in recent years.”)  
 206.  Id. at 27. 
 207.  In 1990, for example, the legislature determined that all crimes of “sexual motivation” would 
be treated as sex crimes subject to enhancement under SSOSA. See supra notes 95–100.  
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also dropped significantly—despite an increase in eligibility.208 Changes in law 
and sentencing patterns such as these have in turn led to increased 
incarceration, as the average guideline sentence maximum is a full six months 
longer than it was twenty years ago. 
The enactment of sentencing reform laws intended to reduce disparity and 
imprisonment rates does not by itself achieve those goals. Nor does the creation 
of a sentencing commission with well-meaning, pragmatic members. Perhaps 
those measures can have a calming effect on popular movements,209 but 
ultimately it is unsurprising that placing sentencing policy squarely in the 
legislature holds that policy accountable to the preferences of the people. 
* * * 
In mid-2011, the Washington state legislature, facing significant budget 
pressures (like other states), changed the nature and functions of the 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission. It no longer is operating as an independent 
agency, but rather as an advisory body to the Office of Financial Management 
in the state’s executive branch.210 The gathering and analysis of sentencing data 
will continue to be conducted; that function will be performed, however, not by 
staff of the Commission (which has been virtually eliminated), but by another 
executive branch agency, the Caseload Forecast Council.211 David Boerner, a 
professor emeritus at Seattle University School of Law, remains chair of the 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Chairman Boerner notes that the Caseload 
Forecast Council is presently headed by the former research director of the 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission.212 Meanwhile, the last Executive Director 
of the Commission, Sandy Mullins, has become Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of Corrections, where she oversees policy development.213 
Professor Boerner reports that Mullins is examining ways of reducing reliance 
on incarceration (and the attendant costs) as a response to violations of 
conditions of supervisory release. 
 
 
 208.  20 YEARS IN SENTENCING, supra note 15, at 46. 
 209.  See Boerner & Lieb, supra note 5, at 110. 
 210.  See S. 5891, 62d Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., § 36 (Wash. 2011) (altering the status of the Commission 
and transferring its duties effective July 1, 2011).  
 211.  See id. § 32; see generally SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N: WASH. STATE, 
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/sgc/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012); WASH. STATE CASELOAD FORECAST 
COUNCIL, http://www.cfc.wa.gov/ (last visited August 20, 2012).  
 212.  Telephone Interview with David Boerner, Chair, Wash. State Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, 
(Jan. 9, 2012).  
 213.  See Jordan Schrader, New Secretary Bernie Warner Reshuffles Leadership of Corrections Dep’t, 
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secretary-bernie-warner-reshuffles-leadership-of-corrections-department/.   
